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1 Introduction
Traditionally, many countries around the world grant life-time tenure to their public
sector employees comprising a rather wide range of occupations from public adminis-
tration over police officers to teachers at public schools. However, the occupations in
which public sector workers obtain civil servant status and life-time tenure strongly
vary across countries. While for example teachers in Germany, France and the US
obtain civil servant status, their colleagues in the Netherlands, Sweden and the United
Kingdom are salaried employees (see OECD, 2005).
The last years have moreover seen a trend towards abolishing the civil servant status
and the corresponding life-time tenure for public sector employees. Switzerland, for
example, introduced a new civil servant law in 2001 which put an end to life-time tenure
contracts. In Germany, proposals to abolish the civil servant status for public sector
workers have been advanced over several decades (see Quint, 1997).1 Furthermore,
many US states currently debate about abolishing life-time tenure for teachers at their
public schools (e.g. US Today, 2008, New York Times, 2008).
In recent years, the academic economic literature has also shown a rising interest in
the design of public sector contracts. The major aim of existing studies is to understand
why payment schemes in public sector occupations are characterized by small worker
rents compared to the private economy. Recent theoretical papers suggest that low
wages in the public sector are efficient since they induce intrinsically motivated workers
to select into public sector employment (e.g. Francois, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2005).
It has so far, however, largely been neglected that public sector contracts are often
characterized by more generous employment protection schemes than private sector
work. Our paper argues that life time tenure may equally affect occupational choices
and may make public sector work attractive for individuals even if they have a low
intrinsic motivation and talent for occupations in the public sector.
The paper starts out with a simple theoretical model which describes the occupa-
tional choice of an individual who can select into employment in the private or public
sector when his productivity in both sectors is uncertain. We assume that worker com-
pensation is more strongly tied to the productivity outcome in the private sector which
1Recently, the OECD sharply criticized Germany for its poor teacher quality and named the civil
servant status to be one of the major reasons for the problem (OECD, 2008).
1
captures that workers in the private economy, in contrary to public sector workers with
life-time tenure, may be dismissed if their productivity outcome is low. Consequently,
the model gives rise to inefficiencies since workers have an incentive to select into public
sector employment to insure against low productivity realizations.
We empirically assess the selection into public sector occupation by exploiting the
natural experiment of the German reunification. After several decades of separation,
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
reunified in 1990. In this course, the FRG’s public civil servant legislation was extended
to public sector workers from the former GDR. However, while the two groups of
workers are employed under the same contractual conditions today, they faced different
incentives at the time of their occupational decision. Precisely, while in the FRG
job security in public sector occupation has traditionally exceeded job security in the
private economy, the former GDR guaranteed full employment protection irrespective
of the occupation. Thus, considerations regarding the employment protection of public
versus non-public sector work plausibly did not affect the occupational choice of workers
in the former GDR.
The empirical analysis is based on micro data from the German Socioeconomic Panel
(GSOEP). We follow the existing literature and take worker absenteeism as a proxy
for worker productivity and intrinsic motivation (see e.g. Garcia-Prado and Chawla,
2006). Precisely, we test the hypothesis that employees who made their employment
decision in the former FRG report a higher number of sick days than employees who
made their occupational choice in the former GDR. Moreover, to control for potential
socio-economic and cultural differences between the two groups, East and West German
workers in the private economy are employed as a control group.
Our findings suggest that granting civil servant status to public sector workers sig-
nificantly affects selection into public and private sector employment. German civil
servants who chose their occupation in the FRG report significantly more sick days
per year than public sector workers who made their occupational choice in the former
GDR. Moreover, the difference in absenteeism of East and West German public civil
servants turns out to be (partly) driven by an increased probability of the former to
report zero sick days per year. This may point towards higher levels of intrinsic moti-
vation as attending working every day, even if there is a good reason for being absent
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on some days (e.g. a minor illness), may indicate a particular commitment and work
motivation. Precisely, while both, civil servants who chose their occupation in the FRG
and civil servants who chose their occupation in the GDR, have a lower probability to
report zero days of absence than private sector workers, the effect is quantitatively by
around two thirds smaller for East German civil servants. Put differently, one third of
the effect is common to all civil servant workers and is thus suggested to reflect moral
hazard problems related to higher employment protection in the civil sector, while two
thirds of the effect is specific to civil servants that chose their occupation in the FRG
and thus suggests an adverse selection effect.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the economic literature. First, it adds
to a number of theoretical papers which investigate the consequence of low-powered
incentives in public sector contracts (like low wages and restricted professional advance-
ment based on seniority rather than performance). While some papers stress adverse
effects, most of the recent contributions suggest that low-powered incentives tend to be
efficient since they attract intrinsically motivated agents into public civil service work
(e.g. Francois, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007). Our paper
suggests that this positive selection mechanism may be dampened if governments grant
life-time tenure for public sector employees.
Related empirical papers mainly address moral hazard problems of low-powered in-
centives in public sector work and investigate the effect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
incentive contracts on the performance of public sector employees. For example, Kahn
et al. (2001) analyze the impact of introducing performance pay at the Brazilian tax
collection authority and find that the scheme had a dramatic effect on fine collections.
Similar results are reported with respect to the introduction of teacher incentive pay
(for a survey, see Burgess and Ratto, 2004). Closely related, a small literature investi-
gates the impact of employment protection in the public civil service sector on worker
productivity. For example, Riphahn (2004) finds strong behavioral responses of public
civil service workers to the degree of their employment protection. Exploiting a dis-
crete jump in the level of job security for German public sector employees, her paper
suggests that worker absenteeism sharply increases in the degree of employment pro-
tection.2 Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate
2Similar results are found for the private economy (see e.g. Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001; Ichino
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the role of occupational selection for the productivity of public civil servants.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a simple theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the identification strategy of our empirical analysis and
the institutional background. Sections 4 and 5 present the data and the estimation
methodology. The empirical results are described in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Theoretical Model
The following model illustrates the incentives for motivated agents to select into dif-
ferent sectors and to subsequently exert effort.
2.1 Model Assumptions
We consider an economy with two sectors, the private sector (indexed by p) and the
civil service sector (indexed by c), and a continuum of agents. The model comprises
two stages. In the first stage, agents make an irreversible decision s ∈ {p, c} in which
sector to work. In the second stage, agents must decide how much unobservable effort
to exert. We will assume that agents can either be successful and produce a high
output (y = y¯) or they are unsuccessful in which case the output will be low (y = y).
Effort e is normalized such that the probability for success equals the effort level e, i.e.
Prob(y = y¯|e) = e.
The decision to exert effort is driven by two main factors. First, we assume that the
agent’s wage depends on his success.4 The agent’s monetary reward in sector i = p, c
is given by wi(y¯) ≡ w¯i if he was successful and by wi(y) = wi < w¯i otherwise. For
example, one could think of w¯i as the agent’s wage upon a promotion and analogously
could interpret wi as the agent’s monetary payoff upon dismissal. We assume that
the wage profile differs across sectors, in particular wp < wc and w¯p > w¯c implying
(w¯p−wp) > (w¯c−wc). That is, an unsuccessful agent will earn less in the private sector,
while a successful agent earns less in the public sector. In line with our motivation on
and Riphahn, 2005).
3While the importance of contract characteristics for worker selection in the public service sector
has so far been neglected, the link between incentive contracts and worker selection was discussed for
the private sector (see Lazear (2000), for the seminal paper).
4To keep the analysis simple we will treat the wage structure in the two sectors as exogenous.
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the introductory section, this relation may reflect stricter firing laws in the civil sector
and promotion being based more heavily on seniority resulting in a flatter wage profile.
The second factor determining the agent’s effort level is his task based intrinsic
motivation which might differ across sectors.5 The stronger the intrinsic motivation
of an agent, the lower is the disutility to exert effort. In particular, we will assume
that a higher level of intrinsic motivation µi lowers the agent’s cost of effort which, for
simplicity, is given by k(ei, µi) =
1
2µi
e2i . We take the agents’ type µ = (µp, µc) ∈ (0, µ¯]2
to be uniformly distributed in the population and assume that the agent learns his
type before he has to make the selection decision. Finally, under the assumption that
the agent is risk averse his expected utility when working in sector i can be written as
Eui = (1− ei)u(wi) + eiu(w¯i)− k(ei, µi).
Defining ui ≡ u(wi), u¯i ≡ u(w¯i) and ∆ui ≡ u¯i − ui, the expected utility is given by
Eui = ui + ei ·∆ui − k(ei, µi). (1)
The timing of the game is as follows. First, nature determines the agent’s type µ. After
the agent has learned his type he chooses the sector he wants to work in. Once this
decision has been made, the agent decides over his effort level. Nature then determines
whether the agent was successful or not and payoffs accrue.
2.2 Analysis
We solve the model backwards. Once an agent has chosen to work in sector i, the
utility maximizing effort level is given by
e∗i ∈ arg max
ei
Eui = ui + ei ·∆ui − k(ei, µi) ⇔
e∗i = ∆ui · µi. (2)
Intuitively, the equilibrium level of effort increases in the agent’s intrinsic motivation
and the intensity of incentives that prevails in that sector.
5We will abstract from any screening or signalling devices which could be employed to improve the
information of the employer.
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At the time the agent has to make the selection decision, he will already anticipate
the effort level he is going to choose subsequently. His (indirect) utility function is
given by
Vi = ui +
1
2
µi ·∆u2i .
The agent will select into whichever sector gives him higher utility. He will therefore
choose the private sector if Vp > Vc or
up +
1
2
µp ·∆u2p ≥ uc +
1
2
µc ·∆u2c ⇔
µp ≥ µ˜p(µc) := 2
(
uc − up
∆u2p
)
+
(
∆u2c
∆u2p
)
· µc. (3)
Note that since the low wage in the civil sector is higher, the first term of the right
hand side is positive, while the higher incentive intensity in the private sector implies
that (∆u2c/∆u
2
p) is smaller than one. Equation (3) is graphically illustrated in figure
1. The line µ˜p in figure 1 depicts all types that are indifferent between the two sectors.
Consequently, all agents with type being above (below) µ˜p will prefer to work in the
private (civil) sector. One can see immediately that agents do not necessarily select
into those sectors for which they have the highest intrinsic motivation. In particular,
it is apparent that those types who exhibit a low motivation for both sectors tend to
prefer the civil sector while those agents with a high level of intrinsic motivation for
both sectors will predominantly select into the private sector. Intuitively, agents with
a low motivation anticipate that their subsequent effort exertion will be low resulting
in only a small chance to be successful. For those agents, the civil sector provides
some insurance since the payoff upon failure uc is higher compared to the private
sector. In contrast, highly motivated types select into the private sector even if their
intrinsic motivation for the civil sector is higher since they benefit from the higher
incentive intensity. We conclude therefore that differences in the wage profiles across
occupational sectors translate into distortions in the agent’s selection incentives.
The distorted selection decision impacts on the average motivation in the two sectors.
One can see that the civil sector will attract a disproportionally low share of agents
with very high motivation (those agents with µc close to µ¯) since among those, agents
who have a high motivation for both sectors, are lost to the private sector. The reverse
holds true for weakly motivated types who will more often end up in the civil sector.
As a result, the average motivation will be higher in the private sector.
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3 Identification and Institutional Background
Empirically identifying the effect of contract differences, in particular differences in
employment protection, on the selection of individuals into public and private sector
work is challenging in the sense that occupations in the private economy differ from
public sector work in several dimensions. Thus, observed differences in characteristics
and preferences of civil servants and private sector employees may have various causes
other than contractual features. Note though that survey information is in line with
the hypothesis derived in the previous section. A survey of the Higher Education
Information System (HIS) among German university students, for example, suggests
that individuals who study to become a teacher (who are granted civil servant status
in Germany) report a significantly higher preference for leisure time than any other
group of university students, see Table 1.
To go beyond this suggestive evidence and identify whether granting more generous
employment protection and civil servant status to public sector employees affects the
selection of workers into the civil service occupation, we follow Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and
Schu¨ndeln (2005) and exploit the German reunification in 1990 as a natural experiment.
Being divided after World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the
former German Democratic Republic (GDR) reunified in 1990. Following the example
of other Western democracies, the FRG after World War II developed to be a market
democracy with privately managed firms. While workers in the private sector faced
a positive risk of dismissal, employees in most civil service occupations were granted
civil servant status. Thus, after a probationary period, public sector workers received
life-time tenure status. In contrast, the GDR was organized as a socialist system with
a central planning office and provided an employment guarantee to all its workers
irrespective of their occupation. Thus, the (expected) job protection level did not vary
between public service occupations and the rest of the economy.
After the reunification in 1990, the West German civil service sector was extended to
East Germany without any restrictions or alterations. Individuals in the former GDR
who had worked in occupations for which civil servant status was granted under the
law of the FRG received public servant status after going through a review process and
subsequently obtained the same rights as their West German colleagues. Since both
groups of workers are employed under the same contractual features today while only
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workers who made their occupational decision in the FRG, at the time of the decision,
faced differing job protection laws between the public and private sector, this natural
experiment allows us to determine the effect of granting civil servant status on the
selection of risk averse individuals into public and private sector work. More detailed
information concerning the institutional background for our identification strategy can
be found in Appendix A.
4 Data and Sample Statistics
Our analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This represen-
tative annual panel survey on individuals and households in Germany was started in
1984 and initially included only individuals in the former FRG. From 1990 on, the data
also covers the new German states which joined from the former GDR.
Following Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005), our analysis comprises observa-
tions from the survey rounds in 1998 to 2006. There are two justifications for taking
1998 as a starting point for our study. Firstly, in 1998 a refreshment sample was added
that significantly increased the number of observations. Secondly, the review process
before granting the civil servant status to an east German took several years (see Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2005) and hence, the number of East German civil service
workers with life–time tenure is low in years prior to 1998.
Moreover, we drop foreigners and migrants and restrict our analysis to labor force
participants. Precisely, we exclude retirees, individuals on military or social service,
individuals who are self-employed or hold minor jobs (below the earnings-threshold of
800 Euros) and individuals in education or apprenticeship. Moreover, we restrict the
age of the individuals to be included in the sample to 55 years to avoid issues raised
by self-selection into early retirement and to ensure that common support is given.
Our analysis seeks to identify the effect of life-time tenure in civil service on the
selection of workers in the private and in the civil service sector. Section 2 suggests
that workers with a low intrinsic motivation and a low expected productivity outcome
may find it attractive to select in the public sector. Our analysis thus requires the
definition of measures that capture worker productivity and motivation. The difficulty
of finding appropriate ways to quantify worker productivity and worker motivation is
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acknowledged by several studies (e.g. Aral et al., 2007), especially with respect to
white collar occupations. Since many civil servant workers are engaged in white collar
tasks, our study faces similar difficulties. For example, the care with which a police
officer interrogates a suspect or the enthusiasm with which a teacher explains new
material to a class, are hard to quantify. Therefore, we rely on the indirect measure
of the number of days absent from work which previous studies suggested to be a
proxy for worker motivation and worker productivity (e.g. Garcia-Prado and Chawla,
2006). Absenteeism can thereby be related to both, a worker’s intrinsic job motivation
as well as to his general productivity. First, intrinsically motivated employees are
perceived to be motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs rather
than because of extrinsic incentives (see e.g. Prendergast, 2007). Consequently, moral
hazard activities like calling in sick although being able to work which are documented
by previous studies (e.g. Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2009) are less likely to apply to
intrinsically motivated workers. In the contrary, intrinsically motivated employees
may even attend work under imperfect health conditions to ensure the progress of their
projects.6 Second, absenteeism may be affected by a worker’s general job productivity
since low levels of productivity may require large effort levels to achieve a certain work
outcome and may result in job stress and the feeling of an overload of work. Among
others, Zavana et al. (2002) and Leontaridi and Ward (2002) point out that job stress
contributes to frequent health problems which may be physical as well as psychic in
nature and which enhance the individual’s days of absenteeism from work.
The absenteeism variable in our sample exhibits a considerable spread with some
workers reporting 50 or more annual days of absence from work due to sickness.7 To
avoid our results being driven by outliers due to severe cases of illness, we restrict our
sample to workers who report less than 50 days of work absence due to illness which
corresponds to the 99th percentile of the days-of-absence-distribution. Since this cut-
off point is chosen arbitrarily, we reran our estimations on alternative samples including
all workers (irrespective of the reported number of days absent from work) and workers
6Human resource managers claim that
”
superficial factors such as sickness, stress, car breakdown,
lack of daycare keep only those people away from work who are not very motivated to be there in first
place“ (McCrimmon, 2008).
7Question: How many days have you been absent from work due to illness this year? (Original
question in German: Wieviele Jahre haben Sie im Jahr [...] wegen Krankheit nicht gearbeitet?)
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with less than 100 days of absence from work and did not find our qualitative results
to be affected.
Moreover, we define an indicator variable for individuals that lived in the GDR before
the reunification in 1990 and, in particular, made their occupational choice there. We
thus split our sample in workers who received their education in East Germany and
West Germany respectively, and will in the following refer to those groups as the East
German sample (East German workers) and the West German sample (West German
workers) respectively. An individual is included in the East sample if he received his
education in the former GDR and was at least 25 years of age in 1990 at time of
reunification. We presume that at the age of 25, individuals already made their final
occupational choice, even if they pursued a university education.8
In total, our sample comprises 19, 054 observations from 5, 832 individuals. Thus, on
average the sample contains 3.27 observations per individual. Precisely, we have 1, 917
observations from 665 individuals which are employed as civil service workers with a
Western German education, 315 observations from 98 individuals which are employed
as civil servant workers with an Eastern German education. Basic sample statistics are
reported in Table 2a. The average number of sick days in our sample is calculated with
5.22 but exhibits a large standard deviation. About half the workers in our sample
report zero sick days while others observe high absenteeism of 20 or more work days.
Moreover, 11.7% of the workers in our sample have civil servant status. Note, that
similar effects as the one described in our theory section are expected for the group of
public sector employees without civil servant status since they commonly also enjoy a
lower dismissal risk than workers in the private sector. We thus reran the regressions
reported in this paper for the whole group of public sector workers and found similar,
although somewhat weaker, results. Furthermore, 27.2% of the workers in our sample
received their education in the GDR.
The sample statistics moreover indicate that 59.1% of the individuals are male,
86.9% live together with a spouse and the majority of workers either holds a vocational
8A possible remedy against the identification strategy is that some individuals in the East sample
may have switched their occupation after reunification. However, in line with Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln und
Schu¨ndeln (2005), we are not concerned about this issue since a possible selection of East Germans in
public and civil service work after reunification, is expected to introduce noise to the estimation and
bias the results towards zero.
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degree (63.2%) or a university degree (21.6%). 4.2% of the workers observe a disability,
the average age is 45.1 years and the average number of children is 0.8. As expected,
most individuals hold jobs which require an education and involve complex tasks and
functions. A small fraction of workers is engaged in a team leading role (6.7%). The
average worker’s tenure is 12.3 years, slightly more than 20% of the workers hold part–
time contracts. The average hourly wage is calculated with 21.9 Euros and the average
number of working hours per week is measured with slightly more than 35 hours.
Table 2b reports the corresponding descriptive statistics for the sub–samples of
workers in the civil service sector with an East and West German education respectively
and for workers in the private sector. In line with our theoretical hypothesis, we find
that the average number of sick days reported by civil servant workers with a West
German education exceeds the average number of sick days reported by civil servants
with an East German education and workers in the private sector (6.12 days versus
4.97 and 5.44 respectively). A comparable pattern can be found with respect to the
probability of reporting a positive number of sick days (65.54% versus 49.62% and
49.68% respectively). Moreover, the sub–groups are homogeneous with respect to
personal characteristics like age and sex but differ to some extend with respect to the
workers’ highest educational degree and their job characteristics. Precisely, workers
in the civil service sector are found to be better educated and to occupy superior job
functions compared to workers in the private economy. This pattern is, however, found
to be equal for civil servants with an East and West German education.
5 Estimation Methodology
Following our theoretical motivation, we estimate the following empirical model
yit = β0 + β1ci + β2cei + β3si + β4xit + it (4)
whereas yit symbolizes the number of sick days as a proxy for the intrinsic motivation
and productivity of individual i at time t.
To assess whether civil servants who made their occupational choice in the former
FRG report more sick days than the control groups of civil servants who made their
occupational choice in the GDR and private sector employees, we define a dummy vari-
able ci which indicates civil servant workers and a dummy variable cei which indicates
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civil servants who made their occupational choice in the former GDR. The dummy
variable si indicates workers (in private firms and the public sector) that received their
education in the former GDR. Our analysis thus employs a difference-in-difference
approach. Controlling for si ensures that our results are not driven by unobserved
differences between individuals who made their occupational choice in the FRG and
GDR respectively, caused, for example, by differences in social norms.
Moreover, we include a full set of state-year dummies to control for (time-varying)
heterogeneity between German states which may affect the number of days of absence
through differences in economic conditions (e.g. the regional unemployment rate),
climate, mentality and social norms. Additionally, to avoid our results being driven by
other individual and work place characteristics, we include several control variables for
the workers’ socio-economic situation xit, comprising personal and job characteristics
like age, sex, family status, job function and tenure.
We estimate equation (4) using ordinary least squares (OLS) as well as count data
models. Since a likelihood ratio test suggests overdispersion, we employ a negative
binomial model instead of poisson. Moreover, as a large number of individuals reports
zero sick days, we additionally run specifications where we apply a zero-inflated negative
binomial regression (which is also suggested by a Vuong test).
6 Estimation Results
The following section presents our estimation results, whereas section 6.1 depicts the
findings of our baseline estimations and section 6.2 reports the results of a falsification
test. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which allow for clustering at the indi-
vidual level are calculated and displayed in the tables below the coefficient estimates.
6.1 Basline Estimations
Table 3 presents our baseline results. In specification (1), we use an OLS approach and
regress the worker’s number of annual sick days on the variables ci and cei, indicat-
ing workers with civil servant status in general and workers with civil servant status
and occupational choice in the former GDR respectively. The specification moreover
includes a dummy si, which indicates individuals that grew up and received their ed-
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ucation in the former GDR. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient
estimate for the variable ci and a negative and significant coefficient estimate for the
interaction term cei. The two coefficient estimates have a comparable size in absolute
terms. Consequently, civil servant workers who made their occupational choice in the
former FRG tend to observe a higher number of sick days than their colleagues in
the private sector, while civil servant workers who made their occupational choice in
the GDR are not found to report a higher number of sick days. Since East and West
German public service workers are employed under the same civil service legislations,
this effect is not driven by differences in work contract conditions. The specification
moreover controls for a set of personal control characteristics, namely the workers’ sex,
age, educational background and family circumstances.
In specification (2), we additionally include a full set of state-year dummies to con-
trol for state specific effects that vary over time, which does not affect our qualitative
or quantitative results. Specification (3) additionally controls for a set of individual
job characteristics to ensure that our effects are not driven by potential underlying
differences in the job features between East and West German civil service employees.
Precisely, we include the employees’ job function, tenure, wage rate as well as indica-
tor variables for part–time work and the number of working hours in the estimation
analysis. Again, we find the coefficient estimates for the civil servant variable ci to
be unaffected. Quantitatively, our results suggest that civil servants who made their
occupational choice in the FRG on average report 2.24 more sick days than comparable
workers in the private economy while civil servants who made their occupational choice
in the former GDR report only 0.65 days higher absenteeism than private sector em-
ployees. The latter estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero as determined
by a Wald test (with a p-value of 0.3207). Note moreover that the control variables
exhibit the expected signs. For example, we find that workers with a longer job tenure
report a higher number of sick days. This supports the results of previous work by
Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001), Riphahn (2004), Ichino and Riphahn (2005) who find
that the employment protection (which increases with a worker’s tenure by German
law) exerts a positive effect on worker absenteeism.
As described above, the count nature of our absenteeism variable, however, suggests
to test whether the results are robust against employing a count data model. A like-
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lihood ratio test indicates overdisperion and suggests that a negative binomial model
is preferable to poisson estimation. Thus, in specifications (4) to (6) we report the
estimation results for a binomial negative count data model. Specification (4) to (6)
correspond to the OLS specifications reported in columns (1) to (3). The coefficient es-
timates turn out to be qualitatively unchanged to our prior findings and the coefficients
for the public service variables again suggest that civil service workers in the West Ger-
man sample report a larger number of days of work absence than private sector workers
while this effect is substantially smaller in the control group of East German civil ser-
vice workers. The quantitative effects are similar to the ones suggested by the OLS
regressions. Precisely, calculating the marginal effects suggests that civil servants who
made their occupational choice in the FRG report 2.52 more sick days than workers
in the private economy, while civil servants who made their occupational choice in the
GDR report only 0.70 sick days more than private sector employees. Again, the latter
estimate is not statistically different from zero (with a p-value of 0.3686).
To account for the large number of individuals with zero sick days, we finally test
the robustness of our findings to estimating a zero inflated negative binomial model,
which combines a logit model to determine the probability of a zero observation with
a negative binomial count data model. The results are reported in Table 4, whereas
the first column in each specification presents the results of the negative binomial
model and the second column reports the results of the logit model determining the
probability of a zero outcome. In specification (1), we include the civil servant variables
ci and cei and a set of control characteristics for the individuals in our sample. Again,
we find that civil servant workers with a West German background report a higher
number of sick days than comparable workers in the private sector whereas this effect
does not prevail for civil servant workers with an East German background (see column
Non-Zero of specification (1)). Moreover, the results indicate that West German civil
servants have a lower probability to report zero sick days than workers in the private
economy. For civil servants with an East German background the same qualitative
effect is derived although the quantitative estimate is around 50% smaller. Similar
results are found if we additionally control for state-year fixed effects in specification
(2) and add control variables for job characteristics in specification (3).
Note that reporting zero days of absence may be a particularly good proxy for
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intrinsic worker motivation since attending work every day, despite reasons for being
absent on some days (e.g. minor illnesses), indicates particular job commitment and
motivation. The logit model in specification (3) suggests that both, civil service workers
in the West and East German sample, observe a lower probability to report zero days of
absence than private sector workers, whereas the effect is however by around two thirds
smaller for the group of East German civil servants. Put differently, the results point
towards moral hazard problems in civil service employment as one third of the effect
is common to both, West and East German civil servants. However, since the effect
of civil servant status is significantly larger for the group of West German workers,
the findings also suggest that adverse selection plays a role in explaining civil servant
worker absenteeism.
Concluding, the results are in line with our hypothesis that differing degrees of em-
ployment protection for public and private sector workers may distort the occupational
choice. Precisely, taking absenteeism as a measure for intrinsic job motivation and pro-
ductivity, the findings suggest that high employment protection and life time tenure in
the public sector induces individuals to select into public sector work even if they have
a low intrinsic motivation for this type of occupation.
6.2 Falsification Test
As an additional robustness check, we run a falsification test and reestimate our model
for workers in East and West Germany who made their occupational choice after 1990.
Precisely, we restrict the sample to individuals who were aged below 17 in 1989. Plau-
sibly, these individuals had not made their final occupational choice before the German
reunification and we expect that both, workers in East and West Germany, anticipated
at the time of their occupational choice that they would in their future job be em-
ployed in a Western market economy with higher employment security in civil servant
occupations compared to private sector work.
The results of this falsification test are presented in Table 5. In specification (1),
we reestimate our baseline OLS model (specification (3) in Table 3). The coefficient
estimate for the civil servant dummy exhibits a positive sign, while the interaction term
cei does not gain statistical significance and even has a positive sign. This suggests
that both, civil servants in West Germany as well as civil servants in East Germany,
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report a higher number of days absent from work than employees in the private sector.
As the effect does not statistically differ between workers in East and West Germany,
the falsification test suggest that our baseline results do not reflect other systematic
differences between East and West German employees. Similar results are found if we
estimate a negative binomial model in specification (2) and a zero-inflated negative
binomial model in specification (3).
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether civil servant status and life-time tenure for public
sector employees impacts on the selection into public sector employment. In a simple
theoretical model, we show that risk averse individuals may have an incentive to select
into civil service work despite a lack of talent and intrinsic motivation if the public sector
employment offers a lower risk to be dismissed in case of low-productivity outcomes.
To test for this effect, we exploit the natural experiment of the German reunification
in 1990. While individuals who made their occupational choice in Western Germany
prior to 1990 faced a situation in which employment protection in the public sector
was significantly larger than employment protection in the private economy, this was
not the case for individuals who made their employment decision in the former GDR
where employment was guaranteed irrespective of the occupation.
Using information from the German Socio-Economic Panel and employing absen-
teeism as proxy for a worker’s productivity and intrinsic motivation, we find a sig-
nificant selection effect: civil servant workers who made their employment decision
in West Germany prior to 1990 report significantly more sick days than civil servant
workers who made their employment decision in East Germany prior to 1990. The
difference partly reflects a higher probability of the former group to report zero days
of absence. Interpreting the number of sick days as measure for intrinsic motivation
and job productivity, this result runs counter to existing arguments which suggest that
it is primarily workers with a high intrinsic motivation who select into public sector
employment due to comparably low wage levels relative to the private economy. From
a policy perspective, our results support recent proposals and attempts in several coun-
tries to abolished life-time tenure status of public service employees (see e.g. OECD,
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2008).
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Appendix A
In the following, we will provide more information on the legal and institutional back-
ground which is relevant for our identification strategy.
Civil Servant Status in Germany/the FRG
Our analysis relies on the assumption that civil service workers in the FRG have faced
a lower dismissal risk than their colleagues in the private sector. In Germany, civil
servant workers receive life-time tenure status after a probationary period. According
to civil service law, a civil servant can moreover only be dismissed if he is sentenced to
at least one year of prison for any criminal charge or if he is sentenced to six months
in prison for any charges associated with treason. In contrast, workers in the private
sector face a positive risk of losing their job in the absence of criminal charges as they
can be dismissed at any time subject to legal and contractual dismissal periods that
may vary with the worker’s tenure.
Note moreover that since 1976 the civil service law has been unified across the
states of the FRG. Thus, since then the national legislature defined the basic legal
conditions for all German civil service workers at the national, state and municipality
level. This includes the general rights and duties of civil servant workers and their life-
time tenure status after a probationary period. The national legislature also decided
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about remuneration schemes for civil servants and supply in case of need like retirement
pay and care in case of accident. This law has been extended to public sector workers
in East Germany in 1990. However, some issues have also been regulated at the state
level, mainly the work hours of civil servant workers, their entitlement to holidays,
special payments like Christmas and vacation bonus. The state regulations are very
similar in most respects. Potential deviations may arise only through differences in
the work hours and special payments for civil servant workers. We thus control for the
latter factors in our regression analysis.
Occupational Choice in the GDR
Moreover, employment security in the GDR did not differ between ‘public’ and ‘private’
sector occupation as job security was guaranteed through the constitution of the GDR.
Consequently, workers did not face any risk with respect to their future employment
situation irrespective of their occupational choice. Although individuals could choose
their occupation in both the FRG and the GDR, it is well-known that children from
working class families had privileged access to the limited places at the GDR’s univer-
sities. However, we are not too concerned about this since these types of interventions
are primarily expected to lead to inferior matches between individuals and occupations
in terms of intrinsic motivation and productivity characteristics, and are expected to
bias our results against us.
Furthermore, as described above, the Unification Treaty regulated that the West
German civil service laws were extended to the East German states. Individuals in
the former GDR who had worked in occupations for which civil servant status was
granted under the law of the FRG had to go through a review process. Reports on
this revision process largely suggest that it was based on formal qualifications (e.g. a
teacher diploma if a person applied for a civil servant position as a teacher) only (Quint,
1997). Furthermore, the GDR state undertook a broader range of tasks than those
performed by the FRG and thus, the Unification treaty provided the method of winding
up entire administrative divisions and dismissing the associated civil service employees
(’Abwicklung’, see Quint, 1997). The German Unification Treaty e.g. allowed for
dismissal of public sector employees if there was no longer any objective need for the
employee’s services and it was possible to close entire administrative divisions and
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dismiss the personnel. Last, employees in the former GDR could be laid off if they
had violated the principles of humanity or rule of law as defined under the provision of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or if they had been active on behalf of the
Ministry of State Security in the former GDR (’Stasi’). Public service workers from
East Germany who remained in their position underwent a review after a three-year
probationary period before receiving life-time tenure and the status of civil servant
(Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2005; Quint, 1997). Since we do not think that
there is reason for a plausible correlation between an individual’s political activity in
the GDR or their job function and the job productivity and motivation which we use
as dependent variable in our analysis, we do not consider our results to be affected by
this review process in any substantial way.9
9Nevertheless, even if this assumption was not to hold, the screening process just adds a ’market’
element into our analysis reflecting the possibility of the government to dismiss workers from their
positions in case of low productivity outcomes, i.e. the government may act like a private firm in a
market economy. This would equally lead to the conclusion that the productivity in the public sector
could be enhanced if the civil servant status was to be abolished.
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Figure 1: The Selection Decision
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Table 1: Student Questionaire: Importance of Leisure Time
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. 95% Confidence Interval
Teacher 585 2.263 .038 2.553 2.701
Cultural Studies 646 2.821 .034 2.754 2.888
Economies and Social Science 1,119 2.770 .028 2.715 2.824
Math and Natural Science 772 2.744 .033 2.679 2.808
Medicin 251 3.138 .057 3.025 3.251
Agriculture and Food 163 2.883 .070 2.774 3.022
Engineering 821 2.729 .030 2.669 2.788
Art 106 2.991 .097 2.799 3.183
Law 163 2.886 .071 2.745 3.027
This table exhibits sample statistics for a survey of university students undertaken by the Higher
Education Information System (HIS). The students were asked to indicate their preference for leisure
time in categories between 1 and 5, with 1 indicating high preference levels and 5 indicating low
preference levels. Obs. indicates the number of observations, Mean is the unweighted average of
observations, Std.Dev. the standard deviation and 95% Confidence Interval the 95% Confidence
Interval.
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Sick Days (Continous) 19, 054 5.2208 8.5243 0 49
Number of Sick Days (Binary) 19, 054 0.4920 0.4999 0 1
Civil Servant 19, 054 0.1171 0.3216 0 1
East Education 19, 054 0.2719 0.4450 0 1
Male 19, 054 0.5914 0.4916 0 1
Spouse 19, 054 0.8694 0.3370 0 1
Highest School Leaving Degree
No Degree 19, 054 0.0080 0.0893 0 1
Low Secondary School (‘Hauptschule’) 19, 054 0.2974 0.4571 0 1
Middle Secondary School (‘Realschule’) 19, 054 0.3599 0.4800 0 1
Technical School (‘Fachschule’) 19, 054 0.0598 0.2371 0 1
University Entry Certification (‘Abitur’) 19, 054 0.2187 0.4134 0 1
Other Degree 19, 054 0.0424 0.2014 0 1
Highest Vocational Degree
No Degree 19, 054 0.0795 0.2705 0 1
Vocational Training 19, 054 0.6322 0.4822 0 1
Master Craftsman 19, 054 0.0871 0.2819 0 1
University 19, 054 0.2161 0.4116 0 1
Disabled 19, 054 0.0423 0.2013 0 1
Number of Children 19, 054 0.8371 0.9998 0 1
Age 19, 054 45.0651 5.0848 34 54
Job Function
Simple Tasks, No Education Required 19, 054 0.1610 0.3675 0 1
Simple Tasks, Education Required 19, 054 0.2423 0.4285 0 1
Complex Tasks 19, 054 0.2925 0.4549 0 1
Highly Complex Tasks 19, 054 0.2365 0.4249 0 1
Team Leading Role 19, 054 0.0670 0.2500 0 1
Tenure 19, 052 12.3007 9.3639 0 41.3
Part-time Work 19, 054 0.2045 0.4033 0 1
Weekly Hours 17, 150 35.1198 8.1487 1.5 75
Hourly Wage in Euro 15, 729 21.9492 12.6330 5.0370 195.5556
Table 2b: Descriptive Statistics - Split Sample
Civil Servants, East Civil Servants, West Workers Priv. Sector
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of Sick Days (Continous) 4.9699 7.6567 6.1185 8.2846 5.4380 8.7542
Number of Sick Days (Binary) 0.4962 0.5009 0.6554 0.4754 0.4968 0.5000
Male 0.6353 0.4822 0.5997 0.4901 0.5870 0.4924
Spouse 0.9586 0.1995 0.9048 0.2936 0.8608 0.3461
Highest School Leaving Degree
No Degree 0 0 0.0019 0.0441 0.0092 0.0955
Low Secondary School (‘Hauptschule’) 0.0113 0.1058 0.1075 0.3099 0.3233 0.4678
Middle Secondary School (‘Realschule’) 0.4736 0.5002 0.2759 0.4471 0.3773 0.4847
Technical School (‘Fachschule’) 0.0902 0.2870 0.0829 0.2758 0.0558 0.2296
University Entry Certification (‘Abitur’) 0.4060 0.4920 0.5078 0.5001 0.1721 0.3775
Other Degree 0.0188 0.1361 0.0065 0.0802 0.0490 0.2159
Highest Vocational Degree
No Degree 0.0075 0.0865 0.0214 0.1447 0.0877 0.2828
Vocational Training 0.5827 0.4940 0.5253 0.4995 0.6555 0.4752
Master Craftsman 0.0827 0.2760 0.0214 0.1447 0.0953 0.2936
University 0.3609 0.4812 0.5563 0.4970 0.1627 0.3691
Disabled 0.0263 0.1604 0.0544 0.2269 0.0424 0.2015
Number of Children 0.5602 0.7808 0.9132 0.9861 0.8281 1.0000
Age 46.0489 5.0791 46.4955 5.0040 44.7620 5.0355
Job Function
Simple Tasks, No Education Required 0 0 0 0 0.1782 0.3827
Simple Tasks, Education Required 0.0301 0.1711 0.0201 0.1403 0.2806 0.4493
Complex Tasks 0.3835 0.4871 0.2772 0.4478 0.3088 0.4620
Highly Complex Tasks 0.3684 0.4833 0.4443 0.4970 0.2068 0.4051
Team Leading Role 0.2180 0.4137 0.2584 0.4379 0.0252 0.1568
Tenure 14.3876 6.6786 20.9483 8.8248 11.3630 8.9897
Part-time Work 0.0714 0.2580 0.2170 0.4123 0.1981 0.3986
Weekly Hours 38.0774 5.8243 34.6314 8.3659 35.2137 7.9874
Hourly Wage in Euro 22.0779 9.0104 27.2513 11.8746 21.3586 12.6373
Table 3: Number of Days of Absenteeism
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Civil Servant 1.7491∗∗∗ 1.7609∗∗∗ 2.2409∗∗∗ 0.3563∗∗∗ 0.3626∗∗∗ 0.4576∗∗∗
(0.2889) (0.2892) (0.3401) (0.0513) (0.0511) (0.0595)
Civil Servant * East −1.7217∗∗∗ −1.7287∗∗∗ −1.5870∗∗ −0.3341∗∗∗ −0.3516∗∗∗ −0.3303∗∗
(0.6640) (0.6655) (0.7196) (0.1378) (0.1397) (0.1507)
East 0.4277∗∗ 0.5309 −0.0785 0.1019∗∗ 0.1089 0.0141
(0.2154) (0.3623) (0.3865) (0.0426) (0.0689) (0.0697)
Male −0.3326∗∗ −0.3504∗∗ −1.6130∗∗∗ −0.0732∗∗∗ −0.0728∗∗ −0.2952∗∗∗
(0.1708) (0.1710) (0.2517) (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0430)
Spouse 0.1304 0.1124 0.4277 0.0182 0.0075 0.0590
(0.2495) (0.2517) (0.2773) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0507)
Highest School Leaving Degree
(Base Cat.: No Degree)
Low Secondary School −0.1941 −0.1626 0.2561 −0.0492 −0.0386 0.0462
(0.3822) (0.3793) (0.4097) (0.0672) (0.0670) (0.0691)
Middle Secondary School −0.7483∗∗∗ −0.7315∗ 0.0229 −0.1644∗∗ −0.1525∗∗ −0.0081
(0.3877) (0.3849) (0.4223) (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.0745)
Technical School −1.3280∗∗∗ −1.3042∗∗∗ −0.7267 −0.3120∗∗∗ −0.3062∗∗∗ −0.1975∗∗
(0.4486) (0.4464) (0.4908) (0.0912) (0.0901) (0.0946)
University Entry Certification −1.2733∗∗∗ −1.2772∗∗∗ −0.4698 −0.2697∗∗∗ −0.2609∗∗∗ −0.1196
(0.4073) (0.4066) (0.4612) (0.0790) (0.0787) (0.0861)
Highest Vocational Degree
(Base Cat.: Voc. T.)
No Degree 0.7157∗∗ 0.7155∗ 0.7365∗ 0.1158∗ 0.1061∗ 0.1145∗∗
(0.3472) (0.3444) (0.3913) (0.0558) (0.0559) (0.0589)
Master Craftsman −0.0813 −0.0770 0.2167 −0.0070 −0.0070 0.0441
(0.2893) (0.2910) (0.3290) (0.3459) (0.0588) (0.0597)
University −1.0059∗∗∗ −0.9998∗∗∗ −0.8719∗∗∗ −0.2418∗∗∗ −0.2455∗∗∗ −0.1714∗∗∗
(0.2498) (0.2528) (0.2808) (0.0544) (0.0546) (0.0589)
Disabled 4.1283∗∗∗ 4.0930∗∗∗ 3.6954∗∗∗ 0.6136∗∗∗ 0.6123∗∗∗ 0.5495∗∗∗
(0.5272) (0.5247) (0.5533) (0.0604) (0.0610) (0.0669)
Number of Children −0.2520∗∗∗ −0.2438∗∗∗ −0.0909 −0.0498∗∗∗ −0.0507∗∗∗ −0.0209
(0.0838) (0.0842) (0.0918) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0176)
Age −0.0283 −0.0270 −0.0088 −0.0049 −0.0052 −0.0020
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0207) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0037)
Table 3: Number of Days of Absenteeism, continued
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Job Function
(Base Cat.: Simple Tasks, No Ed.)
Simple Tasks, Ed. Requ. −0.9798∗∗∗ −0.1434∗∗∗
(0.3346) (0.0519)
Complex Tasks −1.8105∗∗∗ −0.3028∗∗∗
(0.3471) (0.0547)
Highly Complex Tasks −2.4622∗∗∗ −0.4535∗∗∗
(0.4108) (0.0689)
Team Leading Role −4.5500∗∗∗ −0.9169∗∗∗
(0.5075) (0.1113)
Tenure 0.0026 0.0013
(0.0109) (0.0021)
Part-time Work 0.2096 0.1108
(0.4158) (0.0722)
Weekly Hours 0.1099∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0041)
Log Wage 1.4461∗∗∗ 0.3035∗∗∗
(0.2673) (0.0564)
State-Year Effects
√ √ √ √
Estimation Technique OLS OLS OLS NB NB NB
Number of Observations 19, 054 19, 054 15, 729 19, 054 19, 054 15, 729
Number of Individuals 5, 832 5, 832 5, 137 5, 832 5, 832 5, 137
Dependent variable: number of days unable to work due to illness (per year). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clusters at the level of the individuals in parentheses. ∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical
significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. All specifications include a full set of year effects.
Table 4: Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Non-Zero Zero Non-Zero Zero Non-Zero Zero
Civil Servant 0.0883∗∗ −0.6695∗∗∗ 0.0812∗∗ −0.6882∗∗∗ 0.1602∗∗∗ −0.7624∗∗∗
(0.0433) (0.0873) (0.0423) (0.0878) (0.0488) (0.1046)
Civil Servant * East −0.2168∗∗ 0.3890∗ −0.2343∗∗∗ 0.3756∗ −0.1611 0.4863∗∗
(0.0943) (0.2128) (0.0946) (0.2121) (0.1019) (0.2192)
East 0.2435∗∗∗ 0.2820∗∗∗ 0.1335∗∗∗ 0.0342 0.0448 0.0742
(0.0323) (0.0572) (0.0515) (0.0978) (0.0551) (0.1041)
Male −0.0557∗∗ 0.0312 −0.0516∗∗ 0.0366 −0.1054∗∗∗ 0.4168∗∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0464) (0.0251) (0.0466) (0.0326) (0.0648)
Spouse 0.0444 0.0485 0.0387 0.0539 0.0629∗ −0.0153
(0.0361) (0.0656) (0.0352) (0.0661) (0.0375) (0.0728)
Highest School Leaving Degree
(Base Cat.: No Degree)
Low Secondary School −0.0137 0.0716 0.0176 0.1028 0.0970∗ 0.1099
(0.0515) (0.0909) (0.0507) (0.0908) (0.0541) (0.0984)
Middle Secondary School −0.1542∗∗∗ 0.0166 −0.1260∗∗∗ 0.0423 0.0234 0.0495
(0.0542) (0.0954) (0.0536) (0.0955) (0.0585) (0.1062)
Technical School −0.2592∗∗∗ 0.0843 −0.2356∗∗∗ 0.1039 −0.0750 0.2067
(0.0712) (0.1279) (0.0691) (0.1283) (0.0740) (0.1431)
University Entry Certification −0.2925∗∗∗ −0.0762 −0.2723∗∗∗ −0.0606 −0.0902 0.0052
(0.0615) (0.1083) (0.0604) (0.1088) (0.0678) (0.1258)
Highest Vocational Degree
(Base Cat.: Voc. T.)
No Degree 0.0941∗∗ −0.0297 0.0912∗∗ −0.0411 0.0466 −0.1388
(0.0427) (0.0822) (0.0425) (0.0820) (0.0458) (0.0912)
Master Craftsman 0.0121 0.0408 0.0031 0.0246 0.0530 0.0257
(0.0447) (0.0758) (0.0442) (0.0763) (0.0467) (0.0831)
University −0.2390∗∗∗ 0.0276 −0.2375∗∗∗ 0.0386 −0.1757∗∗∗ 0.0555
(0.0438) (0.0748) (0.0432) (0.0756) (0.0475) (0.0852)
Disabled 0.4052∗∗∗ −0.4933∗∗∗ 0.4049∗∗∗ −0.4863∗∗∗ 0.3722∗∗∗ −0.4204∗∗∗
(0.0467) (0.1041) (0.0462) (0.1045) (0.0504) (0.1138)
Number of Children −0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0308 −0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0316 −0.0226 0.0021
(0.0134) (0.0258) (0.0136) (0.0262) (0.0145) (0.0281)
Age 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0055)
Table 4: Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model, continued
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Job Function
(Base Cat.: Simple Tasks, No Ed.)
Simple Tasks, Ed. Requ. −0.1027∗∗∗ 0.0917
(0.0393) (0.0723)
Complex Tasks −0.2389∗∗∗ 0.1562∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0790)
Highly Complex Tasks −0.2791∗∗∗ 0.3302∗∗∗
(0.0534) (0.0984)
Team Leading Role −0.5802∗∗∗ 0.7484∗∗∗
(0.0849) (0.1572)
Tenure −0.0020 −0.0053∗
(0.0016) (0.0030)
Part-time Work 0.0235 −0.0457
(0.0564) (0.1110)
Weekly Hours 0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0053)
Log Wage −0.0075 −0.5788∗∗∗
(0.0443) (0.0756)
State-Year Effects
√ √ √ √
Number of Observations 19, 054 19, 054 15, 729
Zero Observations 9, 679 9, 679 7, 670
Non-Zero Observations 9, 375 9, 375 8, 059
Vuong Test 37.04 38.13 36.02
Dependent variable: number of days unable to work due to illness (per year). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clusters at the level of the individuals in parentheses. ∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical
significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. All specifications include a full set of year effects and a full
set of state-year effects.
Table 5: Job Selection After 1989
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Non-Zero Zero
Civil Servant 1.9339∗∗∗ 0.2985∗∗∗ 0.2250∗∗∗ −0.2846∗
(0.7148) (0.0994) (0.0858) (0.1579)
Civil Servant * East 0.8399 0.2207 −0.0965 −0.6773
(1.5935) (0.2438) (0.1658) (0.4474)
East −0.8179∗∗ −0.1264∗ 0.0127 0.2947∗∗∗
(0.4219) (0.0682) (0.0546) (0.1052)
Estimation Technique OLS NB Zero-NB
Number of Observations 10, 964 10, 964 10, 964
(Pseudo-) R Squared 0.0348 — –
Dependent variable: annual number of days absent from work. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clusters at the level of the individuals in parentheses. ∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical significance at
the 1% / 5% / 10% level. All specifications include a full set of year effects and a full set of state-year
effects.
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